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A HOUSE DIVIDED: EARL CALDWELL, THE NEW YORKTIMES,
AND THE QUEST FOR A TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE
Eric B. Easton'
1. INTRODUCTION

With a Democrat in the White House and strong Democratic majorities in
both the House and Senate, proponents of a federal "shield law" for reporters are
hopeful that the 111 th Congress will finally do what earlier Congresses have failed
to accomplish: enact a statutory testimonial privilege to enable journalists to
protect their confidential sources. I Until it does, however, federal prosecutors will
be permitted to subpoena members of the working press to appear before grand
juries and other tribunals and force them to identify all manner of whistleblowers,
ax-grinders, traitors, patriots, and garden-variety leakers. Once again, journalists
will argue they have a First Amendment right to protect their sources as essential
to gathering the news. And once again, the argument will probably fail.
In the 1972 case of Branzburg v. Hayes,2 the Supreme Court held the First
Amendment does not protect journalists who refuse to reveal their confidential
sources or news gathering product in response to a federal grand jury subpoena. 3
That decision has remained vital for thirty-five years and has reverberated through
a number of recent high-profile cases. 4 Despite some form of protection in nearly

• © 2009 Eric B. Easton, Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law;
J.D., University of Maryland School of Law (l989); Ph.D.' Candidate, Philip Merrill
College of Journalism, University of Maryland College Park; B.S., Medill School of
Journalism, Northwestern University (1968). I wish to thank Earl Caldwell, who graciously
consented to be interviewed for this project, and my dedicated research assistant, Hae-In
Lee, for his help in collecting the many documents necessary to complete it.
1 The U.S. House of Representatives passed the Free Flow of Information Act of
2009, H.R. 985, by voice vote on March 31, 2009. See Samantha Fredrickson, House
Passes Federal Shield Bill, News Media Update (Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press), March 31, 2009, http://www.rcfp.orginewsitems/index.php?i=10682. The U.S.
Senate Judiciary Committee reported its own shield law, S. 448, on Dec. 10, 2009. See
Cristina Abello, Federal Shield Bill Passes Senate JudiCiary Committee, News Media
Update (Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press), Dec. 10, 2009,
http://www.rcfp.org/newsitems/index.php?i=11167.Anidentical "shield law" passed the
House in the 1l0th Congress by a vote of 398-21; a similar bill was approved by the
Senate Judiciary Committee but died at the end of the l10th Congress. Id.
2 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
3 /d. at 667.
4 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Wolfv. United States, 201 F. App'x 430, 432
(9th Cir. 2006); New York Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 172-74 (2d Cir. 2006);
Wen Ho Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 413 F.3d 53, 57-61 (D.C. Cir. 2005); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 968-81 (D.C. Cir. 2005); In re Special Proceedings, 373
F.3d 37, 44--45 (lst Cir. 2004); McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 531-33 (7th Cir.
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every state court, 5 reporters haled before a federal judge may have no. recourse
save prison.
Devastating as Branzburg has been for the so-called "journalist's privilege,"
its negative impact has been far broader. Branzburg is one of the Supreme Court's
earliest newsgathering decisions and arguably the most influentia1. 6 Although the
press has been successful in persuading the courts to find First Amendment
protection for its editorial product, it has been far less successful with regard to
protection for newsgathering. 7 The Branzburg precedent epitomiz~s the frustration
of the press in attempting to secure First Amendment, or even statutory, protection
for newsgathering, and this Article explores one of the primary reasons for that
failure: the inability of the diverse elements that constitute "the press" to agree on
the appropriate scope of such protection.
The legislative debates between media organizations advocating an absolute
privilege and those seeking only a qualified privilege have been widely reported. 8
Far less well known are the conflicts among the various media personalities and
organizations that participated in the Branzburg litigation. These conflicts, this
Article submits, are at least partly responsible for the Branzburg precedent, which
effectively foreclosed the possibility of an expansive First Amendment privilege
for newsgathering.
This Article examines the Branzburg case as an example of strategic litigation
initiated or pursued by mainstream media organizations as part of a continuing
effort to shape the First Amendment doctrine under which journalists practice their
craft. Part II presents the factual background of the three cases that were
consolidated in the Branzburg opinion, as well as brief procedural timelines and
synopses of the opinions in the cases. This Article focuses throughout on what is
by far the most important of the three-Caldwell v. United States. 9 Part III
examines more closely the values of the reporters and editors who decided to take
these cases all the way to the United States Supreme Court through the arguments
that were presented on their behalf. Part IV assesses the benefits of success, the
costs of failure, and the probability of either outcome as they might have been

2003); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Fainaru-Wada, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1115-18 (N.D.
Cal. 2006); United States v. Libby, 432 F. Supp. 2d 26, 43-48 (D.D.C. 2006).
5 Complete information on state shield laws is available at The Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press Web site, Privilege Compendium page, http://
www.rcfP·orgiprivilege/.
6 Only Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539-40 (1965), is earlier, and a quick
LexisNexis search shows that courts claimed to follow Branzburg five times (107-21) as
often as Estes.
7 See Eric B. Easton, The Press as an Interest Group: Mainstream Media in the
United States Supreme Court, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 247,255 (2007) (finding that of the
seventy content regulation cases decided by the Court, the press won forty-three and lost
twenty-seven; in the twenty-four newsgathering cases, the press won only six and lost
eighteen).
8 See infra Part V.B.
9 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
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calculated by the parties at the time. Part V looks at the opinion itself and the
equally unavailing legislative efforts that followed. Finally, the Article offers
tentative conclusions about the miscalculations that left the press with such a
disastrous precedent on the books.
This is not an extended case note on Branzburg or a contemplation of the
journalist's privilege, shield laws, and the like. Much has already been written
along those lines. JO Rather, this is part of the author's continuing study of the press
as a political institution attempting to exercise its influence through the litigation
process.
More important, this Article features the first-person account of Earl
Caldwell, the New York Times reporter whose coverage of the Black Panther
movement and heroic refusal to testify about his news sources before a federal
grand jury brought this issue to the Court's attention.
I
II. BACKGROUND

A. The Caldwell Case

Earl Caldwell was born in Clearfield, Pennsylvania, and attended the
University of Buffalo as a business major until, as an African-American, he
became disillusioned by racism in the insurance industry.ll On returning to
Clearfield, Caldwell landed a job at the local newspaper, The Progress, where he
became a sports editor. 12 From there, he moved on to the Lancaster IntelligencerJournal, and then to the Rochester, N.Y., Democrat and Chronicle, where he first
began writing on racial issues. 13 In 1965, he began reporting for the New York
Herald Tribune, moving briefly to the New York Post when the Herald Tribune
closed. He joined The New York Times in 1967. 14
Caldwell was one of a number of black reporters hired in the mid- and late
1960s by the· mainstream press to cover race relations, particularly the urban

10 See Rex S. Heinke & Galit Avitan, Reconciling Branzburg and Daily Mail: A
Proposalfor a Qualified Reporters' Privilege, 32 OHIO N.V. L. REv. 503, 503-07 (2006);
Leila Wombacher Knox, Note, The Reporter's Privilege: The Necessity of a Federal Shield
Law Thirty Years After Branzburg, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 125, 137-44 (2006);
Kristina Spiruieweber, Comment, Branzburg, Who? The Existence of a Reporter's
Privilege in Federal Courts, 44 DUQ. L. REv. 317,318-22 (2006).
. II Biographical information on Earl Caldwell comes from the Robert C. Maynard
Institute for Journalism Education, where Caldwell is a founding director. Earl Caldwell
Biography, http://www.mije.orgihistoryproject/Biography-EarICaldwell (last visited Dec.
I, 2009). Additional information comes from the author's interview with Earl Caldwell.
See Interview with Earl Caldwell in New York, N.Y. (Feb. 11,2009) [hereinafter Caldwell
Interview] (notes on file with author).
12 Earl Caldwell Biography, supra note II.
13 d.
I
14 d.
I
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rioting that was largely inaccessible to white reporters. 15 Gene Roberts points out
that, until then, only a handful of black reporters worked on white dailies-thirtyone in 1955, according to Ebony magazine. 16 Caldwell recalls that the new influx
of black reporters, who were hired to cover not only the riots but also the dramatic
changes occurring in the black community, led to the formation of the New York
Association of Black Journalists, which played a critical part in his story.17
In the fall of 1968, the Times assigned Caldwell to cover the Black Panther
Party in the San Francisco Bay area, and he developed a confidential relationship
with the Panthers that enabled him to write stories "that no one else in the country
could have written.,,18 Caldwell's stories from that time evince his access to
Panther headquarters and personalities that could not help but attract official
attention. One provided the following description:
In the back room of an apartment deep in the Fillmore slum a
bearded youth in an Afro hair style uncovered a stack of rifles that was
only partly hidden in a dark comer.
.
He said nothing but began wrapping the weapons in robes and old
blankets, preparing to transport them to Oakland, where [Huey] Newton
has been jailed for nearly a year.
Some were high-powered lever action rifles. Others appeared to be
automatic weapons.
"The verdict [in the Newton trial] is irrelevant," the youth said.
"The sky is the limit.,,19
Yet another story related the following details:
It is well past midnight and .quiet out on Shattuck Avenue. The liquor
store on the comer is empty , and the lights are already out in the
barbeque shop next door.
But up in the middle of the block, up there in the two-story
brownstone that the Black Panther party occupies, a dash of yellow light
slips through an upstairs window.
They are still there, up there in those cluttered, noisy rooms behind
windows covered with huge steel plates and walls lined with bulging,
dusty sandbags?O

IS See GENE ROBERTS & HANK KLIBANOFF, THE RACE BEAT: THE PRESS, THE CIVIL
RiGHTS STRUGGLE, AND THE AWAKENING OF A NATION 396 (2006).
16Id. at 365.
17 Caldwell Interview, supra note 11.
18 MAURICE VAN GERPEN, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION AND THE PRESS 37 (1979).
19 Earl Caldwell, Angry Panthers Talk of War and Unwrap Weapons, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 10, 1968, at 30.
20 Earl Caldwell, 'Declining Black Panthers Gather New Support from Repeated
Clashes with Police, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1969, at 64.
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In late 1969, the FBI began calling Caldwell every day, asking him to spy on
his sources. Caldwell refused to cooperate, and, on the advice of bureau chief
Wallace Turner, eventually stopped answering the telephone. 21 "They were
hounding me for over a month," according to Caldwell, who said that FBI callers
warned the office manager: "'You tell him this is not a game. We're not playing
with him. He don't want to talk to us? He can tell it in court. ",22
When a federal marshal initially came to the Times bureau with a subpoena,
Caldwell was OUt. 23 Turner urged him to destroy his files and then do some
reporting from Alaska until it all blew over.24 Caldwell did destroy most of the
files, which he had been saving to write a book and included information on
Panthers he had not written about in the newspapers. ("Panthers I keep in my
pocket," he called them.)25 But once the material was destroyed, he "didn't have it
in [his] heart" to go to Alaska. 26
On February 2, 1970, Caldwell was served with a subpoena duces tecum
ordering him to appear before a federal grand jury in the Northern District of
California. 27 He was told to bring his notes and recorded interviews with the
Panther leadership and to testify as to the purposes and activities of the Party?8
Caldwell believes the FBI broke into the Times bureau or tapped its telephones, or
both, because some of the Panthers named in the subpoena had been "in his
pocket" and never written about. 29 In any event, he objected to the scope of the
subpoena, and his scheduled appearance was postponed. 30 On March 16, however,
he received a second subpoena, without the requirement that he produce
documents. 31 Caldwell and the Times moved to quash on the ground that requiring
Caldwell to testify before the grand jury would "suppress vital constitutional
interests. ,,32
Caldwell was supported by a number of affidavits from New York Times and
Newsweek reporters, as well as an amicus curiae brief from CBS News, with

Caldwell Interview, supra note 11.
Jd.; see also VAN GERPEN, supra note 18, at 37-38.
23 Caldwell Interview, supra note 11.
24 !d.
25 !d.
26 !d.
27 Motion to Quash Grand Jury Subpoenas, in Sup. Ct. App. of Records and Briefs for
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) [hereinafter Branzburg App.], Caldwell v.
United States, 402 U.S. 942 (1971) (No. 70-57), at 4.
28 !d.
29 Caldwell Interview, supra note II.
.
30 Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1083 n.2 (9th Cir. 1970).
31 Subpoena to Testify Before the Grand Jury, in Branzburg App., supra note 27,
Caldwell, 402 U.S. 942 (No. 70-57), at 4,21.
32 Motion to Q~ash Grand Jury Subpoenas, supra note 27, at 4. James Goodale, then
General Counsel of The New York Times Co., says the Times intervened as owner of the
work product of its reporter. See James C. Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the
Developing Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709, 735 (1975).
21

22
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affidavits from its leading correspondents;33 the government filed three memoranda
in opposition to the motion to quash, each supported by affidavits. 34
Behind the scenes, however, all was not harmonious. According to Caldwell,
the Times initially hired the San Francisco law firm Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro to
defend him. 35 According to Caldwell, when he met with John Bates, the attorney
assigned to his case, Bates told him, "We've got a tremendous problem with law
and order out here . . . probably some of your material should be given to the
FBI.,,36 Bates told Caldwell to bring all his material to the office and to meet with
Times Company Executive Vice President Harding Bancroft, who was flying out
to oversee the case, so they could decide what should be turned over. 37
Determined to find his own lawyer, Caldwell sought help from the New York
Association of Black Joumalists. 38 That connection led him to the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund (LDF), which found the perfect lawyer for the case?9 Anthony G.
Amsterdam had handled a number of death penalty cases for LDF 40 and, in 1969,
had helped in the appeal of Black Panther Bobby Seale. 41 He was teaching at
Stanford Law School at the time ~md agreed to hear Caldwell's story.42
33 Affidavits Attached to Motion to Quash, in Branzburg App., supra note 27,
Caldwell, 402 U.S. 942 (No. 70-57), at 9-61.
34 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena, in
Branzburg App., supra note 27, Caldwell, 402 U.S. 942 (No. 70-57), at 62-79 (includes
two supplemental memoranda).
35 Caldwell Interview, supra note II.
36Id. Publicly, the Times editorialized against the subpoenas, but its support for
Caldwell was equivocal:
People whose jobs, associations, or reputations are at stake cannot be
expected to speak freely on an off-the-record basis if they have reason to fear
that both their identity and the totality of their remarks will be turned over to the
police.
The attendant and even more serious danger is that the entire process will
create the impression that the press operates as an investigative agency for
government rather than as an independent force dedicated to the unfettered flow
of information to the public....
This newspaper and all the mass media have the same duties as other
organizations or individuals to cooperate in the processes of justice. But neither
justice nor democracy will benefit if the subpoena power is misused to abridge
the independence and effectiveness of the press.
Subpoenas on the Press, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 4, 1970, at 42.
37 Caldwell Interview, supra note 11.
38 I d.
39 I d.
40 Id.; see also Nadya Labi, A Man Against the Machine, THE LAW SCHOOL: THE
MAGAZINE OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Autumn 2007, at 12.
41 Labi, supra note 40, at 15.
42 Caldwell Interview, supra note 11.
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Caldwell was initially reluctant to talk with another white lawyer, but because
he had nowhere else to turn, he called Amsterdam about midnight and drove to his
home in Los Altos. 43 When Amsterdam told Caldwell he had a "legal right to
44
refuse" to testify, Caldwell was thrilled. Amsterdam took the case pro bono, and
he, not Caldwell, attended the strategy meeting with Bancroft the next day.45 When
Caldwell arrived some hours later,. Bancroft indicated he was delighted with
Amsterdam and wanted to hire him, but Amsterdam refused to accept money from
the paper. 46
On April 6, the district court denied the motion to quash but issued a
protective order limiting the scope of Caldwell's testimony to information given to
him for publication. 47 The court also stayed the effective date of its order pending
appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,48 but the appeal was
dismissed, "apparently on the ground that the District Court order was not
appealable. ,,49
Caldwell received yet a third subpoena on May 22, 1970, and the district court
again ordered attendance under the protective order. 50 Fearing for his personal
safety, he refused to appear before the grand jury in secret. 51 The district court
found Caldwell in contempt, and he again appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 52
According to Caldwell, the' Times Company was furious at the appeal. 53 The
company ordered him back to New York to discuss the matter with General
Counsel James Goodale. 54 Caldwell remembers Goodale shaking his finger in front
of Caldwell's face, saying, "If you keep pushing this, you're going to get a bad law
written.,,55 Goodale's prediction would ultimately come true, but not in the Ninth
Circuit. Caldwell, who did not attend the argument, said Amsterdam convinced the
court that ruining Caldwell's career and risking his life was too high a price for a
grand jury appearance where no confidences would be revealed. 56

Id.
Id.
45 !d.
46 Id.
47 In re Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358,360 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (mem.).
48 Id. at 362.
49 Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1083 n.2.
50 Id.
51 Caldwell Interview, supra note 11.
52 Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1083 n.2.
53 Caldwell Interview, supra note 11.
54 !d.
55 !d.
56 Id. Goodale says "one of the reasons that Amsterdam decided to appeal the
43

44

appearance issue after winning a qualified privilege in the district court was an
apprehension that the government might possibly penetrate the privilege proposed there by
Caldwell in some unknown respect, forcing testimony, albeit of an extremely limited
nature, from Caldwell." Goodale, supra note 32, at 719 n.47 (citing personal
correspondence from Amsterdam).
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The Ninth Circuit reversed on November 16, 1970, ordering the contempt
judgment vacated and holding that "where it has been shown that the public's First
Amendment right to be informed would be jeopardized by requiring a journalist to
submit to secret Grand Jury interrogation, the Government must respond by
demonstrating a compelling need for the witness's presence before [the] judicial
process properly can issue to require attendance.,,57 The United States petitioned
for certiorari, which was granted on May 3, 1971, along with petitions from Paul
Branzburg and Paul Pappas, whose cases are discussed below. 58
B. The Branzburg Case
In 1969, Pau~ Branzburg was ~ twenty-seven-year-old reporter for the
Louisville Courier-Journal, where he served as a member of a special assignment
group doing investigative journalism. 59 Branzburg had received an A.B. from
Cornell University in 1963, a J.D. from Harvard Law School in 1966, and an M.S.
cum laude from Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism in 1967. 60
"His investigative work on the use of narcotics and other issues had been
recognized on numerous occasions, and he was nominated twice for the Pulitzer
Prize based on stories dealing with drugs and agricultural subsidies. 61
On November 15, 1969, the Courier-Journal carried a story by Branzburg
describing his observations of two Louisville "hippies" synthesizing hashish from
marijuana in a makeshift lab. 62 Branzburg wrote: '''I don't know why I'm letting
you do this story,' [Larry] said quietly. 'To make the narcs (narcotics detectives)
mad, I guess. That's the main reason.' However, Larry and his partner asked for
and received a promise that their names would be changed.,,63 The article also
included a photograph of hands working with hashish. 64
Branzburg was subpoenaed shortly thereafter by the Jefferson County grand
jury. He appeared, but declined to identify the "Larry" and "Jack" of his story.65
Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1089.
Caldwell v. United States, 402 U.S. 942 (1971), rev'd sub nom. Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 402 U.S. 942 (1971), aff'd 408
U.S. 665; In re Pappas, 402 U.S. 942 (1971), affd sub nom. Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665.
Caldwell opposed the petition for certiorari on several grounds, none of which was or is
particularly compelling. Brief in Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d
1081 (9th CiT. 1970) (No. 70-57). Indeed, the brief merely "suggests that this case presents
an inopportune occasion for the exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction." Id.
59 Affidavit of Paul M. Branzburg, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-85), at 51-52.
6°Id.
61Id.
62 Paul M. Branzburg, The Hash They Make Isn't To Eat, THE COURIER-JOURNAL,
Nov. 15, 1969.
63 Id. at 3-4.
64 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667.
65 !d. at 668.
57

58
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Branzburg's counsel, Edgar A. Zingman, argued that Kentucky's shield law66
permitted Branzburg to protect his sources, but Judge J. Miles Pound rejected the
argument and directed Branzburg to answer the question. 67 Zingman objected,
citing both the shield law and the press clause of the First Amendment, and
petitioned the Court of Appeals for an injunction against enforcement of Pound's
order. 68 The petition urged the court to grant relief based on the state shield law,
the state constitution, and the United States Constitution as "an interference with
the exercise of freedom of the press [which] would permit courts to destroy that
confidential relationship which is essential to a free press .... ,,69
The Court of Appeals granted a temporary restraining order the same day,70
but a year later denied the petition over a single dissent. 7l Branzburg filed a motion
to reconsider72 based on the newly issued opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Caldwell v. United States. 73 In January 1971, the
Court of Appeals issued a revised opinion without substantive change. 74 The court
did not address the constitutional issue, and Caldwell was never mentioned by
name. 75 A further motion to stay the order pending petition for certiorari76 was
denied. 77
66 The statute provides: "No person shall be compelled to disclose in any legal
proceeding or trial before any court, or before any grand or petit jury, dr before the
presiding officer of any tribunal, or his agent or agents, or before the General Assembly, or
any committee thereof, or before any city or county legislative body, or any committee
thereof, or elsewhere, the source of any information procured or obtained by him, and
published in a newspaper or by a radio or television broadcasting station by which he is
engaged or employed, or with which he is connected." Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.100 (2009).
67 Order, In re: 141087, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665
(1972) (No. 70-85), at 6.
68 Petition for Temporary and Permanent Restraining Order and Writ of Mandamus,
in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at 8-11.
69Id.
70 Order of the Court Granting Temporary Restraining Order, in Branzburg App.,
supra note 27, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at 12.
71 Opinion of the Court by Commissioner Vance Dismissing Petition for Writ of
Prohibition and Writ of Mandamus, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Branzburg, 408
U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at 13.
72 Motion to Reconsider, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665
(No. 70-85), at 21.
73
434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
74 Opinion of the Court by Commissioner Vance,.supra note 71, at 22.
75 [d. at 24 n.1. In that footnote, the court held that Branzburg had abandoned the
constitutional argument and it therefore limited its consideration to the' statutory
interpretation of protected "sources" under the Kentucky shield law. The Uniteci States
Supreme Court would later reject that view, holding the constitutional question was
properly preserved for appeal. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,671 n. 6. (1972).
76 Motion for an Order Staying the Effective Date of the Court's Order, in Branzburg
App., supra note 27, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at 29.
77 Order (modified Jan. 22, 1971), in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Branzburg, 408
U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at 29.
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Even before the revised opinion was issued, Branzburg had published two
more controversial stories based on observations and interviews with Kentucky
drug users. 78 Once again, he was subpoenaed, this time to appear before the
Franklin County grand jury.79 Once again he refused, submitting instead a motion
to quash the subpoena. 8o At the same time, he filed another petition with the
. Kentucky Court of Appeals for injunctive reliefY
Judge Henry Meigs denied the motion subject to issuance of a protective
order in accordance with Caldwell. 82 After hearing arguments from Branzburg and
the Commonwealth, Meigs issued the protective order, which limited the
testimony Branzburg would be required to give to his personal observation of
criminal activity.83 Specifically, he would not be required to reveal confidential
sources or anything told him in confidence. 84
That same day, the Kentucky Court of AppealS denied the petition for
injunctive reliefl 5 and issued its opinion three days later. 86 The Court of Appeals
went to great lengths to distinguish Branzburg's case from the new Caldwell
decision in the Ninth Circuit on their respective facts. 87 The court also expressed
"misgivings" about the rule announced in Caldwell as a "drastic departure from the
generally recognized rule" that journalists' sources are not privileged under the
First Amendment. 88 Once again, Branzburg's motion to stay the order89 was

78 Paul M. Branzburg, Pot Problem Byproduct: Disrespect for the Law, THE
COURIER-JOURNAL & TIMES (Louisville, Ky.), Jan. 10, 1971; Paul M. Branzburg, Rope
Turns to Pot: Once an Industry, Kentucky Hemp Has Become a Drug Problem, THE
COURIER-JOURNAL & TIMES, Jan. 10, 1971.
79 Franklin Circuit Court Grand Jury Subpoena, in Branzburg App., supra note 27,
Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at 29.
80 Motion to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena, in Branzburg App., supra note 27,
Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at 43.
81 Petition for Temporary and Permanent Restraining Order and Writ of Prohibition,
in Branzburg App., supra. note 27, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at 47.
82 Order, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at
45.
83 Protective Order, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No.
70-85), at 46.
84 I d.
85 Order Denying Prohibition and Mandatory Relief, in Branzburg App., supra note
27, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at 54.
86 Opinion· for the Court by Commissioner Vance Denying Petition for Order of
Prohibition, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at
55.
87 Id. at 57-59.
88Id. at 59.
89 Motion for an Order Staying the Effective Date of the Court's Order and Motion
for a Temporary Writ of Prohibition, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Branzburg, 408
U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at 61--62.
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denied. 90 As noted above, Branzburg's petition for certiorari was granted by the
United States Supreme Court on May3, 1971.

C. The Pappas Case
The Pappas case also involved reporting on the Black Panther movement of
the early 1970s.91. Paul Pappas was a television reporter and photographer for
WTEV-TV in New Bedford, Massachusetts,92 working out of the station's office in
East Providence, Rhode Island. 93 On July 30, 1970, he was called to New Bedford
to cover civil disorders there from the Panther perspective. 94 He was given an
address for the Party's storefront headquarters, and after one false start he threaded
his way through the barricades and gained entry.95 There, about 3 p.m., he recorded
and photographed a prepared statement read by one of the Panther leaders. 96
Pappas apparently took his story back to the station after receiving permission
to return to Panther headquarters. 97 He returned about 9 p.m. and was allowed to
enter and remain inside the headquarters on the condition that he not disclose
anything he saw or heard there. 98 If, as the Panthers anticipated, the police raided
the headquarters, Pappas would be free to report and photograph as he wished. 99
The raid never occurred, and Pappas wrote nothing further about the three hours he
100
.
spent at Panther headquarters that night.
Two months later, Pappas was summoned to appear before the Bristol County
grand jury, where he claimed a First Amendment privilege to decline to answer
any questions about his observations and conversations at Panther headquarters
that night. 101 When he was again directed to appear before the grand jury a few
days later, he filed a motion to quash on First Amendment grounds because he
feared "that any future possibilities of obtaining information to be used in my work
would be definitely jeopardized, inasmuch as I wouldn't be trusted or couldn't gain
anyone's confidence to acquire any information in reporting the news as it is.,,I02
Pappas also said he feared for his personal safety.103

90

Order, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at

63.

91 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672.
See VAN GERPEN, supra note 18, at 39.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672.
94Id.
95 VAN GERPEN, supra note 18, at 39.
96 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672.
97Id.
98Id.
99Id.
100 Id.; see also VAN GERPEN, supra note 18, at 39 ("A police raid did not occur that
evening and Pappas kept his promise: He did not write a story about his visit.").
101 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 673.
102 Brieffor Petitioner at 9, In re Pappas, 402 U.S. 942 (1971) (No. 70-94).
103 V AN GERPEN, supra note 18, at 40.
92
93
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The motion to quash was denied by the trial judge, who noted the absence of a
shield law in Massachusetts and held there was no constitutional privilege. l04
"Pappas does not have any privilege and must respond to the subpoena and testify
to such questions as may be put to him by the Grand Jury relating to what he saw
and heard, and the identity of any persons he may have seen.,,105 The case was
reported by the superior court directly to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts for an interlocutory ruling. 106
Despite receiving "helpful and thorough briefs ... filed by Massachusetts and
New York attorneys on behalf of a number of broadcasting, television, and news
gathering interests,,,107 the Supreme Judicial Court on January 29, 1971, refused to
follow Caldwell, on which Pappas and amici "seem[ed] greatly to rely on .... " 108
To follow that opinion, the court said, would be to engage in "judicial amendment
of the Constitution or judiciallegislation.,,109 The court concluded that the Superior
Court was correct in holding that Pappas had no privilege. IIO As it did in
Branzburg and Caldwell, the United States Supreme Court granted Pappas's
petition for certiorari on May 3, 1971. III

D. In the Supreme Court
The three cases were thoroughly briefed in the United States Supreme Court,
and oral arguments were conducted on February 22, 1972, in Caldwell, and the
very next day in Branzburg and Pappas. 112 On June 29, 1972, the Court issued its
opinion, with Justice Byron R. White writing for the Court.!l3 The decision has
been described and analyzed many times,114 including by this author. 115 This
Article returns to the opinion in Part V; for now, it will suffice to say that the Court
reversed Caldwell and affirmed Branzburg and Pappas, finding no testimonial
privilege for reporters in the First Amendment. 116 While Justice White

104 Report of Superior C~urt for Bristol County, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, In
re Pappas, 402 U.S. 942 (No. 70-94), at 6-8.
.
.
105 Id. at 8.

106

/d.

In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297,299 n.2 (Mass. 1971).
108 /d. at 301-02.
109 Id. at 302.
110 Id. at 304.
III In re Pappas, 402 U.S. 942, 942 (1971).
112 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,665 (1972).
107

113

/d.

See supra note lO and accompanying text.
Eric B. Easton, Two Wrongs Mock a Right: Overcoming the Cohen Maledicta
That Bar First Amendment Protection for Newsgathering, 58 OHIO ST. LJ. 1135, 1149-50
(1997).
116 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 708.
114

115
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acknowledged that news gathering qualifies for some measure of First Amendment
protection,J17 the Court was deeply divided as to the scope of that protection.
Writing in dissent, Justice Douglas would have found that journalists have "an
absolute right not to appear before a grand jury .... ,,118 Also in dissent, Justice
Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, would have affirmed the
balancing test in Caldwell. 119 Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, interpreted
Justice White's opinion for the Court as requiring courts to strike "a proper balance
between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant
testimony with respect to criminal conduct.,,120
Although Powell's concurring opinion is sometimes seen as a fifth vote for an
undefined reporter's privilege,121 Justice White's opinion l22 is more widely viewed
as a stunning defeat for the press with lasting precedential consequences.123 Yet
mainstream media organizations initiated the litigation that led to the Branzburg
decision. Mainstream media organizations made the decision to appeal all of these
cases to the United States Courts of Appeals and two of them to the United States
Supreme Court. And mainstream media organizations provided the theoretical
foundation for all the appeals through party and amicus briefs. That makes
Branzburg an excellent candidate to further explore how the press makes strategic
litigation decisions.
III. JOURNALISTIC VALUES
In each of the cases considered in this Article, the reporters-Earl Caldwell,
Paul Branzburg, and Paul Pappas-were confronted with three choices: (1) testify
before the grand jury, breaking one or more promises of confidentiality; (2) refuse
to testify and risk being jailed for contempt of court; or (3) litigate the issue to
avoid either testifying or going to jail. Assuming their employers would pay for
117 !d. at 681("We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or assembly
to the country's welfare. Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First
Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the
press could be eviscerated.").
118 Id. at 712 (Douglas, 1., dissenting).
119 See id. at 747 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
120 !d. at 710 (powell, J., concurring).
121 See, e.g., In re Roche, 448 U.S. 1312, 1315 (1980) (expressing the view that
Branzburg stands for the proposition that the First Amendment provides some degree of
protection for a reporter's confidences); see also Goodale, supra note 32, at 709
(discussing Justice Powell's concurrence as supporting a "qualified newsman's privilege"
judged on a case-by-case basis).
122 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667 (White, 1., joined by Burger, c.J., Blackmun, Powell,
& Rehnquist, J.1).
123 See, e.g., Laurence B. Alexander, Looking Gut for the Watchdogs: A Legislative

Proposal Limiting the Newsgathering Privilege to Journalists in the Greatest Need of
Protection for Sources and Information, 20 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 97, 110 (2002)
(discussing how reporters were unable to convince the Court to recognize a constitutional
privilege to "protect their confidential sources and information").
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litigation, the reporters' choices were not surprising. But litigation costs money,
not only in attorney fees and court costs, but also in lost productivity and general
distraction. The logical economic choice for their employers would be to
encourage the reporters to testify. As noted above, the Times Company initially
opposed Caldwell's refusal to comply with the subpoena l24 and his appeal to the
Ninth Circuit, but there is no indication that financial considerations played a role
in that decision. 125 Moreover, the company ultimately joined Caldwell's motion to
quash the original subpoena. 126
In the end, all three cases were litigated, suggesting that the personal or
journalistic values at stake transcended economics. Caldwell's fear for his personal
safety certainly weighed heavily in his desire to litigate rather than appear or
testify, but he never believed his employer shared that concern.127 Nor was fear
Caldwell's sole motivation; appearing before the grand jury would, at minimum,
deprive him of the access he needed to fulfill his self-described "mission to tell the
truth, to tell the story.,,128 The briefs and oral arguments presented in the three
cases suggest three core journalistic values that might be considered fundamental:
1. Satisfying the public's "right to know";
2. Upholding the reporter's ethical responsibility;
3. Preventing press entanglement with government. 129
This Article turns to the filings to see how these three values were asserted as
journalistic justifications for finding a reporter's privilege in the First Amendment.

A. Right to Know
Much has been written, pro and con, about the public's so-called "right to
knoW.,,130 Often, the question is framed as whether the First Amendment's press
clause contemplates something more than the absence of governmental restriction
on the right to publish the information one already knows, including an affirmative
right to acquire information in the public interest. Whatever the legal soundness of
that proposition, it is axiomatic that the journalistic enterprise depends utterly upon

See supra notes 36-58 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 36-58 and accompanying text.
126 See supra notes 27-58 and accompanying text. John Bates of Pillsbury, Madison
& Sutro represented the Times.
127 Caldwell Interview, supra note 11.
128 Id.
129 See, e.g., Brief of the New York Times Co. et al. as Amici Curiae at 2-4, Caldwell
v. United States, 402 U.S. 942 (1971) (No. 70-57) (arguing in favor of a qualified
privilege); Brief for the Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 4-5,
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-85) (urging the Court to adopt an
absolute privilege to ensure separation of new sources from government).
130 See, e.g., Eric B. Easton, Public Importance: BalanCing Proprietary Rights and
the Right to Know, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139, 141 (2003) (arguing that "the First
Amendment's penumbral 'right to know' is the source of a 'public importance test"').
124
125
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the public's right to know in justifying not only its "preferred position,,131 in our
democratic society, but its very existence.132
In each of the three Branzburg cases, the argument growing out of this value
goes something like this: requiring reporters to testify before grand juries would
undermine any promise of confidentiality that a reporter might extend to sources of
information, thus have a chilling effect on sources' willingness to provide
information that the public has a right to know. One or another version of this
argument is not only present in each of the cases, it is central to all of them. Paul
Branzburg's argument to the Supreme Court states the argument this way:
A. Newsgathering activities are essential to the effective functioning
of a free press, and as such are protected by the First Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. A significant portion of such
news gathering activities is the development by individual reporters of
confidential informants who give information to the reporter with the
understanding that some or all of the information or the source of such
information will not be revealed.
B. The courts below are attempting to force the Petitioner to appear
before a grand jury to answer questions pertaining to the identities of
such informants and unpublished information received from them. Such
compelled testimony will inevitably discourage these and other
informants from contacting and talking to reporters, as well as
discourage the reporter from publishing information gathered from such
sources. This inability of the press to be able to obtain such information,
or its reluctance to use such information, is a severe abridgment of the
freedom of the press protected by the First Amendment. 133
In his brief for The New York Times and other amici on Caldwell's behalf,
noted attorney and Yale law professor Alexander Bickel stated the case even more
succinctly:
The people's right to be informed by print and electronic news
media is thus the central concern of the First Amendment's Freedom of
Speech and of the Press Clause .... [If] an obligation is imposed by law
on a reporter of news to disclose the identity of confidential sources ...
the reporter's access to news, and therefore the public's access, will be
severely constricted and in some circumstances shut off. The reporter's
access is the public's access .... The issue here is the public's right to
131 See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) ("Freedom of press,
freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position.").
132 BILL KOVACH & TOM ROSENSTIEL, THE ELEMENTS OF JOURNALISM 17 (2001)
("The primary purpose of journalism is to provide citizens with the information they need
to be free and self-governing.") ..
133 Brief for Petitioner Paul M. Branzburg at 9, Branzburg v. Hayes, 40~ U.S. 665
(1972) (No. 70-85).
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know. That right is the reporter's by virtue of the proxy which the
Freedom of the Press Clause of the First Amendment gives to the press
on behalf of the public. 134
In its brief supporting Branzburg, the American Newspaper Publishers
Association (ANPA) argued similarly that "but for the assurance of confidence,
many controversial issues presented in the daily newspapers of this country would
otherwise never reach the typesetting stage.,,135 And at oral argument, Branzburg's
attorney, Edgar Zingman, insisted that "it is necessary to the functioning of the
press, and it has been a part of the process of the press, that such confidences be
given, and those confidences are the condition upon which information is available
to the public.,,136
In Pappas and Caldwell, the argument is pressed, not only by the parties and
amici, but through affidavits from prominent individual journalists. Pappas's
petition for certiorari contains the following footnote:
In an amicus brief filed in this case by the Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc., before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,
correspondents Walter Cronkite, Eric Sevareid, Mike Wallace, Dan
Rather and Marvin Kalb submitted affidavits strongly asserting the
necessity of preserving confidentiality in newsgathering and
demonstrating that the betrayal of news sources and private
communications would seriously diminish the effectiveness of reporting
and the amount and nature of news available to the public. Example after
example was given, from talks with bartenders to discussions with the
President of the United States, in which it was essential to preserve
confidentiality .137
These affidavits, which were originally submitted as part of the record in
Caldwell, along with others from New York Times and Newsweek reporters,138
prompted the Massachusetts court to remark upon the "substantial news media
pressure for adoption" of a reporter's privilege. 139 Indeed, more than twenty major
news organizations filed amicus briefs supporting the three reporters in these
134 Brief of the New York Times Co. et ai., supra note 129, at 16.
135 Brief for the Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass'n, supra note 129, at 8.
136 Transcript of Oral Argument, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 u.s. 665 (1972) (No. 7085), reprinted in 74 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 678 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds.,
1975).
.
137 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Judicial Court for the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts at 12 n.9, In re Pappas, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-94).
138 Affidavits Attached to Supplemental Memorandum of The New York Times and
Newsweek, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Caldwell v. United States, 402 U.S. 942
(1971) (No. 70-57), at 37-50.
139 In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297,303 n.11 (Mass. 1971).
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cases I4°--each emphasizing the "right to know" value and the threat to that value
by a chilling effect on sources or self-censorship by reporters. 141

B. Ethical Responsibility
If the "right to know" value provided the principal justification for finding a
reporter's privilege in the First Amendment, the "ethical responsibility" value
might be seen as a normative supplement to the instrumentalism of "right to
know." As the current version of the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ)
Code of Ethics makes clear, journalists are expected to keep their promises of
confidentiality to sources. 142 Because the normative argument is far less
compelling to a court, however, it is barely mentioned within the Branzburg
advocacy documents.
The "ethical responsibility" notion does surface in the Radio Television News
Directors Association (RTNDA) brief, at least in a footnote:
Until now reporters have often risked contempt convIctions in
challenging compulsory process for the disclosure of confidential
information; they have been encouraged to do so by a belief that there is
First Amendment underpinning for their position, as well as by moral
commitments to informants. In this manner confidential relationships
have been supported by the reporter's fulfillment of his promise not to
betray confidences, even though several lower courts have refused to
recognize a constitutional privilege. If, however, the Supreme Court were
to rule in such a way as to remove or seriously compromise the legal

140 The organizations were the American Broadcasting Co., American Newspaper
Publishers Association, American Newspaper Guild, American Society of Newspaper
Editors, Associated Press Broadcasters' Association, Associated Press Managing Editors
Association, Association of American Publishers, Authors League of America, Columbia
Broadcasting System, Chicago Daily News, Chicago Sun-Times, Chicago Tribune Co.,
Dow Jones, National Press Photographers Association, National Broadcasting Co.,
Newsweek, New York Times, Radio Television News Directors Association, Sigma Delta
Chi, Washington Post Co., and a coalition of religious broadcasters, as well as the
American Civil Liberties Union. See infra notes 248, 251-254, 256--260.
141 See, e.g., Brief for New York Times Co. et aI., supra note 129, at 35 ("[R]equiring
a reporter to disclose information obtained in confidence would chill ... a substantial flow
of news to the public.").
142 SOCIETY
OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS, CODE OF ETHICS (1996),
http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.pdf ("Identify sources whenever feasible. The public is
entitled to as much information as possible on sources' reliability. Always question
sources' motives before promising anonymity. Clarify conditions attached to any promise
made in exchange for information. Keep promises.").
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underpinning of this basic ethic o/journalists, a reporter would not be so
likely to guarantee confidentiality unconditionally. 143
Notwithstanding thi~ decidedly minimal treatment in the Branzburg cases, the
"ethical responsibility" rationale exists independently ,within the journalism
community. Ironically, evidence of this comes from the betrayal of a confidential
source that led to another Supreme Court opinion written by Justice White. l44 In
Cohen v. Cowles Media, reporters for the Minneapolis Star Tribune and St. Paul
Pioneer Press, among others, accepted an offer by Dan Cohen, a Republican
campaign operative, for information concerning Marlene Johnson, the DemocraticFarmer-Laborite candidate for lieutenant governor of Minnesota, in exchange for a
promise of confidentiality. 145 Cohen then provided the reporters with court records
showing the candidate had two trivial arrests, leading to dismissed charges in one
case and a vacated conviction in the other. 146
Editors at both papers independently decided to print the story, not of the
candidate's indiscretions, but of Cohen's "dirty trick" and, over their reporters'
protests, to identify Cohen by name. 147 As the author has previously noted:
While the Pioneer Press editors buried Dan Cohen's name deep in
the story, the Star Tribune editors featured it, apparently reasoning that
the value of the story, ifany, lay in Cohen's conduct, not Johnson's. The
Star Tribune also attacked Cohen in its editorial pages, but neither paper
reported that it had broken a promise of confidentiality with Cohen. 148
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court upheld Cohen's claim for damages
against the newspapers for breaking their promise of confidentiality. 149
From the editors' perspective, the public's "right to know" trumped the
reporters' "ethical responsibility" to keep their promises. From the protesting
reporters' perspective, the reverse was true. Either way, this episode shows that
these values are independent, although related, and both are fundamental; the
Cohen case is still debated in newsrooms today.

C. Government Entanglement
The third journalistic value found in the Branzburg documents is an aversion
to serving as, or at least being perceived as, an agent of the government. Again,
143 Brief for Radio Television News Directors Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 7 n.4, Caldwell v. United States, 402 U.S. 942 (1971) (No. 70-57) (emphasis
added).
144 Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
145 Easton, supra note 115, at 1153-54.
146 !d.
147 [d.
148 [d.
149 Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670.
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this value is related to the "right to know," but it has implications beyond
news gathering to suggest an effect on reporting as well. Indeed, two of Kovach
and Rosenstiel' s nine "elements of journalism" stress independence: independence
from faction and independence from power. 150
As discussed in ANPA's amicus brief in Caldwell, "the subpoenas involved in
these appeals pierce the wall traditionally separating the press and the
government.,,151 ANPA quoted extensively on that point from the Ninth Circuit
opinion:
If the Grand Jury may require appellant to make available' to it
information obtained by him in his capacity as news gatherer, then the
Grand Jury and the Department of Justice have the power to appropriate
appellant's investigative efforts to their own behalf-to convert him after
the fact into an investigative agent of the Government. The very concept
of a free press requires that the news media be accorded a measure of
autonomy; that they should be free to pursue their own investigations to
their own ends without fear of governmental interlerence; and that they
should be able to protect their investigative processes. 152
The Newspaper Guild's brief in Caldwell and Pappas also quoted the Ninth
Circuit passage and further asserted that widespread use of the press as a
government agency was responsible for increasing violence against reporters by
police and participants during public demonstrations. 153 "Not only does the prolific
use of the subpoena impress a governmental function on the press; the practice, in
addition to the destruction of communication with confidential news sources,
significantly impairs the ability of the newsman to report public events of great
significance." 154
Still another danger of "government entanglement" caught the ACLU's
attention: abuse of the grand jury process to harass reporters. Once conceived as a
buffer between the state and the people, the civil liberties group said, grand juries
have increasingly become "rubber stamps" for prosecutors and "instrument[s] for
police investigation.,,155
The prosecutor simply sits back, waits for the reporter to investigate and
then causes the grand jury to issue a sweeping subpoena, regardless of
the effects on the journalist's relationship to his confidential sources.
KOVACH & ROSENSTlEL, supra note 132, at 94, 112.
Brief for the Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass'n, supra note 129, at 8-9.
152 Id. at 9 (citing Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081; 1086 (9th CiT. 1970)).
153 Brief for the Am. Newspaper Guild et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 7, Caldwell v. United States, 402 U.S. 942 (1971) (No. 70-57), and In re
Pappas, 402 U.S. 942 (1971) (No. 70-94).
150
151

154

Id.

Brief for the Am. Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 28, Caldwell v. United States, 402 U.S. 942 (1971) (No. 70-57).
155
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Equally dangerous is the possibility that overbroad grand jury subpoenas
will be used to penalize reporters who write news stories which the
government finds objectionable and to deter such stories in the future. 156
All of the foregoing demonstrates convincingly that the cases consolidated in
Branzburg v. Hayes involved values the press considers fundamental to its
constitutional role. A successful outcome in the litigation would have yielded
statutory or constitutional interpretations that would have vindicated those values
and greatly facilitated the work of all journalists. But that alone is not enough to
justify the time and treasure the press put into this case. Part IV examines the
relative costs, benefits, and likelihood of success of the Branzburg litigation.
IV. STRATEGY
As noted above, the fact that these cases were litigated at all suggests that
fundamental values were at stake. This Part posits that the decision to pursue these
cases also depended on the parties' assessment of the benefits of success, the costs
of failure, and the probability of either outcome. We begin by exploring the factors
. that may have led the media lawyers to think they could win.
A. Probability of Success

To reconstruct the participants' perception as to the probability of success or
failure in the Branzburg cases, this section first examines precedent and related
doctrines-particularly in the lower courts, where prior decisions may be binding
and where stare decisis and other canons of jurisprudence are more compelling
than in the highest courts. Second, this section analyzes judicial preferences,
including political ideology, judicial philosophy, and attitudes toward the press,
from the litigants' perspective. Finally, this section looks at public policy, as
articulated in statutes and executive practices.
1. Precedent

As a general proposition, precedent and other jurisprudential considerations
should have operated to discourage the litigants from pursuing these cases. But the
Caldwell decision in the Ninth Circuit may well have created the impression in the
Branzburg and Pappas camps that the weight of precedent could be overcome. 157

156

Id. at 29.

Pappas specifically told the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that he
would file a petition for certiorari "[i]n view of the conflict between the decision of our
court in the Matter of Paul Pappas and the decision of the Federal Court in the Matter of
Caldwell vs. United States." Application for Stay of the Order of the Supreme Judicial
Court, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, In re Pappas, 402 U.S. 942 (1971) (No. 70-94), at
24.
157
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The most widely cited judicial precedent rejecting the reporter's testimonial
privilege was Garland v. Torre,158 an appeal from a criminal contempt holding. In
the underlying case, singer Judy Garland had filed a libel claim against the
Columbia Broadcasting System based on allegedly defamatory statements about
her that appeared in a New York Herald Tribune column. 159 The statements were
attributed to an unnamed CBS executive, and columnist. Marie Torre refused to
identify the source of the statements when the court ordered her to do SO.160 In an
opinion authored by then Judge (later Justice) Potter Stewart; a Second Circuit
panel declined to find a constitutional privilege that would protect Torre's
source. 161
The court accepted the "hypothesis that compulsory disclosure of a
journalist's confidential sources of information may entail an abridgment of press
freedom by imposing some limitation upon the availability of news.,,162 But the
court pointed out that the freedom so abridged is not absolute, saying, "What must
be determined is whether the interest to be served by compelling the testimony of
the witness in the present case justifies some impairment of this First Amendment
freedom.;,163 Quoting Chief Justice Hughes's admonition that giving testimony is
the duty of every citizen,164 the court extended the principle to the press. "If an
additional First Amendment liberty-the freedom of the press-is here involved,
we do not hesitate to conclude that it too must give place under the Constitution to
a paramount public interest in the fair administration of justice.,,165
Although Garland was not binding on any of the courts involved in the
Branzburg cases, Judge Stewart had noted that no previous court had found a
reporter's privilege in the absence of a statute. 166 Although proponents of the
privilege tried to distinguish Garland,167 the precedents overwhelmingly favored
compelling reporters' testimony, and, of course, Judge Stewart had become Justice
Stewart.
The Ninth Circuit opinion in Caldwell was issued eleven days before the
Kentucky Court of Appeals denied Paul Branzburg's motion to quash in
Branzburg v. Pound. Ten days later, Branzburg filed a motion to reconsider that
decision in light of the Caldwell holding. 168 The court reissued its original opinion,

158 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958).
159 !d. at 547.
Id.
Id.
162 !d. at 548.
163 !d.
164 !d. at 549 (quoting Blackmerv. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932)).
165 Id.
166 Id. at 550.
167 See, e.g., Brieffor Petitioner, supra note 102, at 39 (distinguishing Garland).
168 Motion to Reconsider, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Branzburg, 408 U.S.
655 (1972) (No. 70-85), at 21-22.
160
161
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adding only a footnote to assert that Branzburg had abandoned his constitutional
argument, rendering Caldwell irrelevant without mentioning it. 169
By the time Branzburg v. Meigs l70 reached the Kentucky Court of Appeals,
Caldwell had been integrated into Branzburg's case. As noted above, the court
both distinguished Branzburg from Caldwell on their facts and expressed
"misgivings" about the rule announced in Caldwell. 171 Nevertheless, the Caldwell
decision may well have given Branzburg's team the confidence that, in taking the
case up to the Supreme Court, the weight of precedent would be a much closer.
call.
In Massachusetts, meanwhile, Pappas relied on the protective order granted
by the district court in Caldwell to support his motion to quash.l72 Superior Court
Justice Frank E. Smith noted that reliance, but otherwise did not address the new
case in ruling that Pappas had no privilege. 173 By the time the Supreme Judicial
Court reviewed Smith's ruling, the Ninth Circuit opinion in Caldwell had been out
for about six weeks. Again, as discussed above, the precedent did not move the
court,174 but it may well have encouraged Pappas to press on.
But if the favorable Caldwell decisions encouraged Branzburg and Pappas to
appeal their cases to the Supreme Court, precedent provides no explanation for
Caldwell's decision to incur a contempt judgment by refusing to appear before the
grand jury under the district court's protective order. Indeed, we know that Times
Company General Counsel James Goodale and Caldwell's attorney, Anthony
Amsterdam, looked at the same precedents and reached different conclusions.
Amsterdam unequivocally told Caldwell that he had a "right" to refuse to testify,175
while Goodale vigorously opposed Caldwell's taking the appeal because he fe'ared
it would make "bad law.,,176 Goodale, the more experienced media lawyer, got the
outcome right in the end. But Amsterdam was more in tune with his client's
wishes, and the case moved ahead.
2. Judicial Preferences

One possible key to Amsterdam's assertion may have been a sense that the
federal courts in California would be as sympathetic as any, anywhere in the
country.177 Judge Zirpoli had been appointed by President John F. Kennedy and
169 Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345,346 n.1 (Ky. 1971).
170 Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W. 2d 748,750 (Ky. 1971).
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
Report of Superior Court for Bristol County, supra note lO4, at 7.
173 Id. at 7-8.
.
174 See supra notes lO8-lO9 and accompanying text.
175 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
176 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
177 Caldwell is the focus of this discussion because it seems highly unlikely that
either Branzburg or Pappas would have been motivated to pursue their cases by the
ideology of their states' appellate courts. All seven justices who heard Pappas's case before
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court were appointed by Republican governors.
171

172
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had served about ten years when the Caldwell case came up.178 For much of his
career, however, he had been a prosecutor, serving as assistant district attorney for
the City and County of San Francisco from 1928-1932, and as assistant United
States attorney in Northern California from 1933-1944. 179
On the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Republican appointees held an eightto-five edge over Democrats in 1970. 180 The three-judge panel that Caldwell
ultimately drew included Eisenhower appointee Charles Merton Merrill I 81 and
Johnson appointee Walter Raleigh Ely, Jr.,182 as well as another Eisenhower
appointee, William R. Jameson, a U.S. District Judge for the District of Montana,
sitting by designation. 183 So if the ideology of the judges was a motivating factor, it
was not predictable by party affiliation. Yet the overwhelmingly favorable opinion
issued by the Ninth Circuit pariel made it all but inevitable that the government
would seek and the Supreme Court would grant certiorari. 184
Presumably, both Amsterdam and Goodale considered the preferences of the
Supreme Court justices at some point during the litigation. But that consideration
would have been strategically valuable only on or before June 4, 1970, when
Caldwell incurred the contempt judgment that formed the basis for his appeal to

Compare Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court,
http://www.massreports.com/justices/alljustices.aspx (last visited Dec. 1,2009) (listing' the
justices' respective appointment dates), with Former Governors of Massachusetts from
1780, http://www.netstate.com/states/governmentimajormergov.htm (last visited Dec. 1,
2009) (listing the Governors of Massachusetts). Please note, according to the Justices of the
Supreme Judicial Court Web site, Jacob Spiegel was appointed in 1960; however, his
memorials state he was appointed in 1961, thereby making Governor Vope the appointing
governor. Compare Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Justices of the Supreme
Judicial Court, http://www.massreports.com/justices/alljustices.aspx (last visited Dec. 1,
2009), with Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Memorials, http://
www.massreports.com/memorials/394maI115.htm (last visited Dec. I, 2009). The seven
justices who heard Brimzburg's case before the Kentucky Court of Appeals, the state's only
appeJlate court at the time, were all elected. See Commonwealth of Kentucky, Court of
Justice, http://courts.ky.gov/courtofappeals (last visited Dec. I, 2009) (noting that
"[fJourteen judges, two elected from seven appellate court districts, serve on the Court of
Appeals"). Having lost decisively at the trial court level, both Branzburg and Pappas were
likely to pursue their appeals through the state courts regardless of actual or perceived
ideological preferences.
178 Federal
Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges,
http://www.fjc.gov/publicihome.nsfihisj (search for Zirpoli) (last visited Dec. 1,2009).
179
180

[d.
[d.

181

Federal Judicial Center, supra note 178 (search for Merrill).

182

/d. (search for Ely).
/d. (search for Jameson).

183

See LEE EpSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 85-86 (1998)
(suspecting that the Court is "reluctant to ignore disputes that the government wants them
to resolve").
184
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the Ninth Circuit. 185 From that moment on, the decision to take the case to the
Supreme Court was effectively out of his hands.
The Burger Court in 1970 was ideologically divided into three groupS.186 On
the left were Justices Hugo Black and William O. Douglas, very nearly First
Amendment absolutists, and usually reliable liberals William Brennan and
Thurgood Marshall. 187 On the right were Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice
Harry Blackmun, then called "The Minnesota Twins" for their matched
conservatism. 188 In the center were moderate Republicans John Marshall Harlan
and Potter Stewart, as well as conservative Democrat Byron White. 189 Justices
Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist, who would ultimately hear the Branzburg
case, had not yet replaced Black and Harlan.
The justices sitting in June 1970 had voted in sixteen press-related cases over
the years. 190 Of the eighty-seven votes cast by the nine justices in those sixteen
cases, sixty-one votes, or 70 percent of the total, were cast in favor of the press's
position; only twenty-six votes, or 30 percent, were cast against the press's
position.1 91 Amsterdam and Goodale were certainly aware that Black and Harlan
were nearing retirement and that Richard Nixon was president, but the likelihood
of success must still have looked strong based on ideological preferences in June
1970.
Moreover, Justice White's hostility toward the press had not begun to
manifest itself before June 1970. To be sure, he had written one opinion that could
be interpreted as denying broadcasters their full First Amendment rights/ 92 and
two separate opinions l93 expressing reservations against broadly interpreting the
standards in New York Times v. Sullivan. 194 But the Red Lion decision had been
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 188-189 and accompanying text.
187 See CHARLES M. LAMB & STEPHEN C. HALPERN, THE BURGER COURT: POLITICAL
AND JUDICIAL PROFILES 110, 133 (1991).
188 !d. at 68.
189 See id. at 8, 193,376.
190 The identification of press-related cases was taken from Easton, supra note 7, at
261.
191 The voting records came from the Congressional Quarterly, Inc., CQ Press
Electronic Library, Supreme Court Collection, http://library.cqpress.com (last visited Dec.
1,2009).
192 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 385 (1969) (upholding the personal
attack and editorial reply rules of the FCC's "Fairness Doctrine" against challenge by
broadcasters).
193 Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 22-23 (1970) (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (insisting that the press could be held liable for using words
that might have both innocent and libelous meanings); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S.
563, 583 (1968) (White, J., concurring in part- and dissenting in part) (refusing to follow the
Court's dictum suggesting that proof of harm would be required to fire a public school
teacher who made intentionally or recklessly false statements about the school board).
194 376 U.S. 254,279,283 (1964) (requiring public officials to prove actual malice to
prevail in a libel suit).
185

186
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unanimous against the broadcasters,195 and White had supported the broadcasters
in another important case, Estes v. Texas,196 by dissenting from the opinion that
cameras in the courtroom were per se unconstitutional. 197 White also had
unequivocally supported Sullivan itself and most of its progeny through 1970. 198
Although White's antipathy toward the press is said to date from his football
days,199 its clear expression would only come later. 2oo The Court had not heard any
newsgathering cases before 1970, and Caldwell's legal team could not have
anticipated the strength of White's opposition to extending First Amendment
protection to newsgathering activities. 201
Ironically, Amsterdam must have counted Justice Potter Stewart among the
likely opponents of the privilege. After all, he had been the author of the oft-cited
Garland v. Torre 202 decision when he served on the Second Circuit, and there was
no reason to believe he would change his mind?03 A reasonable head count of the
Supreme Court bench at the time would have found Black, Douglas, Brennan, and
195 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
381 U.S. 532 (1965).
Id. at 615-16 (White, 1., dissenting).
198 See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); Curtis Publ'g Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 173-74 (1967) (Brennan, 1., dissenting) (joining a dissent more
favorable to the press than the majority opinion); Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-91
(1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,
74-75 (1964).
199 DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHlZZER WHITE: A
PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 449-50 (1998).
200 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 390-91 (1974) (White, 1.,
dissenting) ("The communications industry has increasingly become concentrated in a few
powerful hands operating very lucrative businesses reaching across the Nation and into
almost every home. Neither the industry as a whole nor its individual components are
easily intimidated, and we are fortunate that they are not. Requiring them to pay for the
occasional damage they do to private reputation will play no substantial part in their future
performance or their existence."); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 263
(1974) (White, 1., concurring) ("To me it is a near absurdity to so deprecate individual
dignity, as the Court does in Gertz, and to leave the people at the complete mercy of the
press, at least in this stage of our history when the press, as the majority in this case so well
documents, is steadily becoming more powerful and much less likely to be deterred by
threats of libel suits.").
201 In addition to Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), see White's majority
opinions in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (holding promises of
confidentiality from reporters to sources are enforceable against the press), and Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 567-68 (1978) (holding neither the First nor Fourth
Amendments prohibited the government from using search warrants to recover evidence
believed to be in newsrooms); see also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978)
(White joining the majority and holding that the press has no greater right of access to
government-held information than the general public); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,
833-35 (1974) (same); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (same).
202 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958).
203 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
196

197
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Marshall solidly in favor of the privilege; Harlan, Burger, Blackmun, and Stewart
solidly against; and White very probably in favor.
In short, if Amsterdam· had conducted an analysis of judicial preferences
before June 4, 1970, that analysis would have suggested that success was at least as
likely as failure, if not more likely, and he would not have been dissuaded from
taking the case further. Of course, no one could have predicted the appointments of
Powell and Rehnquist to the Supreme Court, much less the pivotal role that Powell
would come to play.204 To Caldwell, however, it was Rehnquist's appointment that
was most problematic. 2os Caldwell says the late Fred Graham, legal reporter for the
Times and later CBS News, told him Rehnquist had been deeply involved in his
case while serving in the Department of Justice. 206 And he deeply believes that the
Times Company's half-hearted support for his cause undermined Caldwell's
efforts to persuade Rehnquist to recuse himself.207 Had he done so, the 4-4 decision
would have affirmed the Ninth Circuit, although it would have had no precedential
value. 208

3. Public Policy
To this point, this Article has suggested that Caldwell may have been
encouraged to try for a better First Amendment interpretation from the appellate
courts based on the liberal reputation of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
generally and the still liberal-leaning United States Supreme Court, which had
overwhelmingly supported the press in recent years. It has further suggested that
Branzburg and Pappas may well have been encouraged to seek Supreme Court
review of their cases, despite the absence of compelling precedent, based on the
Caldwell decision in the Ninth Circuit.
To help determine how realistic those expectations might have been, this
section now turns to public policy considerations. Public policy is broadly defined
as the expressipn of the people's will by the political branches of government
through statutes and executive practice. 209 Here, identifying the prevailing public
policy requires us to examine the prevalence of reporter's shield laws and the
policies of the Department of Justice on issuing subpoenas commanding reporters
to testify. The analysis will show that, while only Branzburg had a legitimate
expectation based on public policy of a better deal than he got from the courts, all
three journalists might have been encouraged by new Department of Justice rules
governing reporters' testimony.
Perhaps the best place to begin a discussion of the relevant public policy is
Wigmore's hoary dictum th~t "the public . . . has a right to every man's
204

205
206
207

See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
Caldwell Interview, supra note II.
Id ..
/d.

208 /d. Caldwell points to a memo posted by Managing Editor Abe Rosenthal stating,
'''We all feel bad for Earl Caldwell and the difficult position he finds himselfin. '" Id.
209 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1267 (8th ed. 2004).
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evidence,,,21o quoted in one form or another throughout these cases. 211 All
testimonial privileges, whether grounded in statute, common law, or the
Constitution, are exceptions to this general rule and, according to traditional
principles of interpretation, must therefore be narrowly construed.
Of the three jurisdictions involved in this case, only Kentucky had enacted a
testimonial privilege for reporters, often called a reporter's shield law. 212 That
statute was the principal basis, along with constitutional arguments, for
Branzburg's initial request for injunctive relief and subsequent state court
213
appeals.
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals ruled that the shield law was
inapplicable because it protected only the "source" of Branzburg's information and
not his personal observations. 214
The court took great pains to distinguish the "source" of any information
procured by a reporter, whose identity was privileged by the statute, from the
"information" itself. 215 Here, Branzburg was not asked to reveal the identity of any
informants he may have had, the court said, but rather the identity of persons he
saw committing a crime. 216
In all likelihood the present case is complicated by the fact that the
persons who committed the crime were probably the same persons who
informed Branzburg that the crime would be, or was being, committed. If
so, this is a rare case where informants actually informed against
themselves. But in that event the privilege which would have protected
disclosure of their identity as informants cannot be extended beyond their
role as informants to protect their identity in the entirely different role as
perpetrators of a crime (emphasis in original).217
Otherwise, the court said, a reporter who witnessed the assassination of the
president or governor, or a bank robbery in progress, or a forcible rape, could not
be required to identify the perpetrator. 218 Chief Justice Edward P. Hill, writing in
dissent, rejected that parade of horribles and called the majority view "a strained
and unnecessarily narrow construction" of the term source.219 Hill pointed out that
210 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2192 (John T. McNaughton
rev. 1961).
211 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972); In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d
297,299 (Mass. 1971).
212 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (LexisNexis 2006). To this day, neither
Massachusetts nor the federal government has enacted a similar statute.
213 Petition for Temporary and Permanent Restraining Order and Writ of Mandamus,
in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at 8-11.
214 Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345,347-48 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970).
215 /d. at 347-48.
216 Id. at 348.
218

/d.
/d.

219

See id. (Hill, C.J., dissenting).
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the statute contained no such limitation and quoted extensively from a
Pennsylvania case upholding that state's shield law.
[I]mportant information, tips and leads will dry up and the public will
often be deprived ofthe knowledge of dereliction of public duty, bribery,
corruption, conspiracy and other crimes committed or possibly
committed by public officials or by powerful individuals or
organizations, unless newsmen are able to fully and completely protect
the sources of their information. It is vitally important that this public
shield against governmental inefficiency, corruption and crime be
preserved against piercing and erosion.
The [shield law] is a wise and salutary declaration of public policy
whose spiritual father is the revered Constitutionally ordained freedom of
the press. The Act must therefore, we repeat, be liberally and broadly
construed in order to carry out the clear objective and intent of the
Legislature which has placed the gathering and the protection of the
source of news as of greater importance to the public interest and of
more value to the public welfare than the disclosure of the alleged crime
or the alleged criminal. 220
But Chief Justice Hill was the only state judge in all of these cases to support
the privilege. In the Pappas case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court took
pains to point out that, "unlike certain other states," Massachusetts had created no
reporter's privilege. 221 The court cited opposition to the privilege in the American
Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence to support the rejection of both statutory
and constitutional privileges. 222 And in the Ninth Circuit, District Judge Jameson's
concurring opinion also pointedly noted that Congress had not enacted a shield law
as he expressed the view that Judge Zirpoli's protective order might have satisfied
223
Caldwell's constitutional rights.
.
On the other hand, seventeen states had enacted shield laws by 1970,224 and
several of those enactments had occurred only recently.225 One could reasonably
expect that the Supreme Court might be swayed by the trend in public policy in
favor of the privilege. The lawyers would also have been aware of a dramatic
development within the Justice Department of President Richard Nixon.
220

Id. at 349 (Hill, C.J., dissenting) (quoting In re Taylor, 193 A.2d 181, 185-86 (Pa.

1963)).
In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297,299 (Mass. 1971).
Id. at 299-301.
223 Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1092 (9th Cir. 1970) (Jameson, J.,
concurring). Jameson's comment regarding Congress's failure to enact a shield law was
duly noted by Justice Cutter in his opinion for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in
Pappas. 266 N.E.2d at 302.
224 For a list of state shield laws at the time, see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 691,
689 n.27 (1972).
225 Id.
221
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During the oral arguments before the Ninth Circuit, counsel for the
government submitted a press release from Attorney General John N. Mitchell,
outlining new guidelines for issuing subpoenas to the news media. As summarized
by Judge Jameson, the guidelines "expressly recognized that the 'Department does
not approve of utilizing the press as a spring board for investigations. '" It further
stated:
There should be sufficient reason to believe that the information sought
is essential to a successful investigation-particularly with reference to
directly establishing guilt or innocence .... The government should have
unsuccessfully attempted to obtain the information from alternative nonpress sources. . . . [S]ubpoenas should normally be limited to the
verification of published information and to such surrounding
circumstances as relate to the accuracy of the published information....
[S]ubpoenas should, wherever possible, be directed at material
information regarding a limited subject matter, should cover a reasonably
limited period of time, and should avoid requiring production of a large
volume of unpublished materia1. 226
While the Justice Department's announcement of the gui~elines followed by
two months Caldwell's critical decision on June 4, 1970, to refuse to appear, work
on the guidelines was well under way before then. And although there is nothing in
the record to indicate the extent of their knowledge, there is little doubt that
. Caldwell and Amsterdam would have known about the guidelines at the time. The
guidelines were being drafted by William H. Rehnquist, who was appointed by
President Nixon in 1969 to be assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal
Counsel,227 and Jack C. Landau, former Supreme Court reporter for the Newhouse
News Service.228 Landau joined the Nixon Justice Department in 1969, only to
leave in April 1970 to return to Newhouse.229 Landau had been a key figure in the
early days of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, which was

226 Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1091-92 n.3 (Jameson, J., concurring) (quoting John N.
Mitchell, Free Press and Fair Trial: The Subpoena Controversy, Address Before House of
Delegates, American Bar Association (Aug. 10, 1970)). The guidelines were formally
published as United States Department of Justice Memorandum No. 692. 39 U.S.L.W.
2111 (Aug. 25, 1970). A complete copy was also published in The New York Times, Aug.
11, 1970, p. 24, and attached as an appendix to Levin v. Marshall, 317 F. Supp. 169, 173
(D. Md. 1970).
227 LIIILegal Information Institute, Cornell University, Supreme Court Collection,
http://supct.law.comell.edu/supct/justices/rehnquist.hio.html (last visited Dec. 1,2009).
228 Floyd J. McKay, First Amendment Guerillas: Formative Years of the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, 6 JOURNALISM & COMM. MONOGRAPHS 105, 112
(2004).
229

[d.
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formed specifically to deal with the Caldwell case, and became executive director
of the organization not long after his return to Newhouse.23o
By the time briefs were filed in the United States Supreme Court, the
guidelines were being held up by the journalists and amici as the government's
recognition that grand jury inquiries could pose First Amendment problems. 23i
Perhaps the most extensive use of the guidelines appears in Alexander Bickel's
amicus brief in Caldwell for the New York Times Co. and other media companies.
Acknowledging that the guidelines do not have the force of law, Bickel said they
nevertheless "evince most authoritatively a developing consensus of what the law
should be.,,2J2
Thus, taking three critical predictors of success-precedent, preferences, and
public.policy-as a whole, the press had some reason to believe that it could win
the fight for a testimonial privilege under the First Amendment. The Caldwell
decision in the Ninth Circuit seemed likely to counterbalance older, adverse
precedent,233 there seemed to be five potentially favorable votes on the Supreme
Court, and public policy as articulated by several state legislatures and the
Department of Justice seemed to be moving in the right direction. Additional
factors, such as the strong support of amic?34-including the American Civil
Liberties Union235-and some of the nation's best legal talent, must have seemed
sufficient to overcome the government's opposition. 236
230 The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, About the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press: A Short History, http://www.rcfp.org/about.html(last
visited Dec. 1,2009).
231 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 102, at 17; see also Brief for Nat'l Broad. Co. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10-11, In re Pappas, 402 U.S. 942 (1971) (No. 7094).
232 Brief of the New York Times Co. et aI., supra note 129, at 12.
233 See Brief for Nat'l Broad. Co., supra note 231, at 9-10 (citing several similar
lower court decisions around the same tirpe, including People v. Rios, No. 75129 (Cal.
Super. Ct. July 15, 1970); People v. Dohrn, No. 69-3808 (Cook County, III. Cir. Ct. May
20, 1970); Transcript of April 6, 1970 at 18-24,36, and Transcript of April 7, 1970 at 21,
38-39, 149-51, Air Transp. Ass'n v. Profl Air Traffic Controllers Org., No. 70-C-400-4l0
(E.D. N.Y. April 6--7, 1970); and Transcript of Dec. 4, 1969, Alioto v. Cowles Comm., No.
52150 (N.D. CaL».
234 Some scholarship suggests that disproportionately strong amici support may be
counterproductive. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus
Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 743, 829 (2000). However, those
findings are certainly counterintuitive and probably would have surprised the litigants here.
My own research on press cases suggests that support from press amici has been largely
irrelevant to the outcome. See Easton, supra note 7, at 256.
235 My previous research shows that the press has been far more successful when
supported by the ACLU than when opposed by the ACLU, winning 76 percent of its cases
with the ACLU on board and losing 83 percent when opposed by the ACLU. Easton, supra
note 7, at 257.
236 The federal government, of course, was a party opponent in Caldwell, and amicus
curiae in Branzburg and Pappas. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,665--67 (1972). In
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Even if some doubts remained about the likelihood of success, important
forces within the media apparently concluded that the benefits of pursuing the
cases to vict9ry-an absolute or qualified First Amendment privilege-outweighed
the costs of defeat. The. next section turns to that cost-benefit analysis.
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis

It is hard to overstate how devastating the Branzburg precedent has been for
newsgathering; the Supreme Court's refusal to find a meaningful First Amendment
privilege in that case has been the foundation for numerous decisions minimizing
any First Amendment right to gather news.237 Moreover, the high cost of an
adverse decision in Branzburg was obviously apparent to Times Company General
Counsel James Goodale, who warned Caldwell that his appeal to the Ninth Circuit
could make "bad law.,,238
On the other hand, a victory in Branzburg must have seemed especially
beneficial in light of the Nixon administration's and local prosecutors'
unprecedented use of subpoenas for reporters' sources, notes, pictures, and
testimony that characterized the late 1960s.239 Particularly after the 1968
Democratic convention, subpoenas targeting the coverage of anti-Vietnam War
activists and Black Power militants like Caldwell's Panthers proliferated. 240
McKay calls the rapid increase in the number of subpoenas "staggering," citing
research showing about· 500 subpoenas served on reporters between 1970 and
1976, compared to about a dozen between 1960 and 1968.241
either capacity, the government is unquestionably the most formidable opponent the press
could face. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Government Gorilla: Why Does Government Come
Out Ahead in Appellate Courts?, in IN LITIGATION: Do THE "HAVES" STILL COME OUT
AHEAD? 343 (Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey eds., 2003); Easton, supra note 7, at
257; Kearney & Merrill, supra note 234, at 829.
237 See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media, Inc., 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1993) (citing
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 665, for the proposition "that generally applicable laws do not
offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news"); Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,
438 U.S. I, II (1978) (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684, for the proposition that "there is
no First Amendment right of access to information"); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S.
547, 566 (1978) (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 665, for the proposition that "it does not
make a constitutional difference" whether search warrants or subpoenas served on reporters
will result in the disappearance of confidential sources or cause the press to suppress the
news); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684-85,
for the proposition that '" [n]ewsmen have no constitutional right of access to the scenes of
crime or disaster when the general public is excluded"').
238 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
239 McKay, supra note 228, at Ill.
240 Id.
241 /d. at 112. For a sense of the magnitude of the subpoena assault, see the list of 120
subpoenas served on reporters from NBC, CBS, and their wholly owned stations included
as an Appendix to Brief of the New York Times Co. et aI., supra note 129.
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Of course, it is not possible to quantify and analyze the cost of a disastrous
precedent in Branzburg versus the benefits of pennanent relief from the threat of
subpoenas. But it is entirely .possible that a rough cost-benefit calculation,
tempered by the probability of success, may have influenced the decision of
most-but not all-media participants to ask the Supreme Court for a qualified,
rather than absolute, testimonial privilege. An absolute privilege, going beyond the
ruling of the Ninth Circuit, beyond even the benefits of most state shield laws,
would have been the most desirable, yet least likely, outcome in the case. Thus,
prudence would have dictated a reasoned argument for a qualified privilege-a
somewhat less desirable, but far more likely, outcome-except for those
participants who calculated that the benefits of an absolute shield outweighed the
cost of losing the case altogether.
The initial response to the subpoenas by Caldwell and the Times-a plea in
242
the alternative to quash the subpoenas or issue a protective order --certainly
reflected a degree of caution. Even after the split between Caldwell and the Times,
Caldwell's opposition to the government's petition for certiorari suggests they
were reasonably satisfied with the Ninth Circuit opinion?43 Caldwell's brief in
opposition suggested the Court could best confront "the vexing and difficult First
Amendment problems presented by grand jury subpoenas addressed to newsmen
... after more than one lower court has grappled with them.,,244
In his brief to the Supreme Court, Amsterdam argued for a qualified privilege,
but with a strong presumption of confidentiality.245 He insisted that a "compelling
state interest" was required by the First Amendment to force a reporter to appear
before a grand jury. 246 "The elements of such a showing are at least three," he said:
(1) The 'infonnation sought must be demonstrably relevant to a
clearly defined, legitimate subject of governmental inquiry .... '
(2) It must affinnatively appear that the inquiry is likely to turn up
material information, that is: (a) that there is some factual basis for
pursuing the investigation, and (b) that there is reasonable ground to
conclude that the particular witness subpoenaed has infonnation material
to it ... [and]
(3) The infonnation sought must be unobtainable by means less
destructive of First Amendment freedoms. 247

The New York Times also insisted on a "compelling interest" standard as
amicus in the Supreme Court proceeding.248 Joined by NBC, CBS, and ABC, by
Caldwell v. United States, 311 F. SllPP. 358, 360 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
See Brief in Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Caldwell v. United
States, 402 U.S. 942 (1971) (No. 70-57).
244 Id. at 3.
245 See Brieffor Respondent at 81, Caldwell, 402 U.S. 942 (No. 70-57).
242
243

247

Id.
Id. at 82-84.

248

Brief of the New York Times Co. et aI., supra note 129, at 8.

246
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the Chicago Sun-Times and Daily News, by the Associated Press Managing Editors
and Broadcasters' Associations, and by the Association of American Publishers,
the Times urged the Court to require the government to "clearly demonstrate a
compelling and overriding interest in the information" before requiring a reporter
to testify?49 The Times went on to explain that such a standard would preclude
requiring a reporter's testimony "with respect to a category of crimes that cannot
be deemed 'major,' as for example crimes variously characterized as 'victimless,'
'regulatory,' and 'sumptuary. ",250
Other amici urged a similar standard. For example, the Chicago Tribune
sought· to limit testimony to evidence "so important that non-production thereof
would cause a miscarriage of justice.,,251 The Radio Television News Directors
Association characterized the desired standard as "irreparable harm," rather than
"compelling interest," and said "the Court should adopt a standard which in the
normal situation would raise no more than the slightest possibility of later
disclosure.,,252 A "compelling need" standard was urged by the Authors League of
America253 and a coalition of religious groups?54
But even if one assumes that these groups advocated a balancing test, albeit
with a very high standard, because they believed the benefits of an absolute
privilege were outweighed by the cost of defeat,255 other media organizations
reached the opposite conclusion. The American Newspaper Publishers
Association, for example, openly broke with the Times and joint amici as to the
standard required:
Nothing short of an absolute privilege, under the First Amendment,
vested in professional newsmen to refuse to testify before any tribunal
about any information or source of information derived as a result of
their reportorial functions will create the certainty needed to generate
confidence in their promises, whether express or implied, to preserve
either a source's anonymity or privacy, and thus guarantee the right of
the public to be fully informed. 256

249

/d.

[d.
251 Brief for Chicago Tribune Co. as Amicus Curiae at 18, Caldwell v. United States,
402 U.S. 942 (1971) (No. 70-57).
252 Brief for Radio Television News Directors Ass'n, supra note 143, at 10.
253 Brief of the Authors League of Am., Inc., as Amicus Curiae at 7, Caldwell, 402
U.S. 492 (1971) (No. 70-57).
254 Brief of Office of Communication of The United Church of Christ et al. as Amici
Curiae at 22, Caldwell, 402 U.S. 492 (No. 70-57).
255 Of course, there may be other, non-strategic reasons for advocating a qualified
privilege, including a sincere belief that reporters should have to testify under some
circumstances.
256 Brieffor the Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass'n, supra note 129, at 4.
250
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ANPA was joined in that position by the Washington Post and Newsweek;257
the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Dow Jones, and Sigma Delta Chi;258
and the National Press Photographers Association. 259 Even the venerable ACLU
suggested that because reporters should only be required to testify to their
knowledge concerning a planned, future crime of violence, "it may be preferable
for the Court to adopt something approximating an absolute privilege, leaving to
another day the carving out of possible exceptions.,,26o
Whether one believes that the media representatives' advocacy of an absolute
or qualified privilege was a reasonable proxy for their strategic cost-benefit
analyses, or sincere expressions of their views of the law, it is clear that the press
was a "house divided" on the desired scope of the testimonial privilege they
sought. This failure to speak with one voice may have diluted the message being
sent to the Court that such a privilege, whatever its scope, was commanded by the
First Amendment. It would certainly have that effect in the legislative arena?61 In
the end, Branzburg v. Hayes was a stunning defeat/ 62 with long-lasting
implications for First Amendment doctrine.
V. BRANZBURG AND THE LEGISLATIVE AFTERMATH

A. The Branzburg Opinion

Paul Pappas's reply brief before the Supreme Court quotes a then-new report
by University of Michigan Law School Professor Vincent Blasi for a then-new
organization called Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, which had been
organized in response to the Caldwell case: 263
257 Brief of the Washington Post Co. and Newsweek, Inc., as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 4, Caldwell, 402 U.S. 492 (No. 70-57).
258 Brief of Am. Soc'y of Newspaper Editors et aI. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 24, Caldwell, 402 U.S. 492 (No. 70-57).
259 Brief of the National Press Photographers Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 2, Caldwell,
402 U.S. 492 (No. 70-57).
260 Brief of the Am. Civil Liberties Union et aI., supra note 155, at 23.
261 See infra Part V.B.
262 Caldwell believes to this day that lukewarm support from The New York Times
was responsible for the defeat. Caldwell Interview, supra note 11. He told the author that
the late Fred Graham, then-Supreme Court and Justice Department reporter for the Times,
had evidence that William Rehnquist had prejudged his case while at Justice and that
appropriate pressure from the Times would' have forced Rehnquist to recuse' himself from
the case. [d.
263 McKay, supra note 228, at 108. As chronicled by McKay, a member of the
organization's steering committee from 1976 to 1986, the RCFP grew out of a 1970
meeting of thirty-five to forty reporters at Georgetown University who gathered
specifically to discuss the Caldwell case. See id. at 108-09. Caldwell was seen as the most
visible example of a dramatic increase in the use of subpoenas served on reporters in an
effort to tap into the radical movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s. See id. at 111. In
the aftermath of Branzburg, the RCFP played a major role in advocating for an absolute
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Nothing, in the opinion of every reporter with whom I discussed the
matter, would be more damaging to source relationships than a Supreme
Court reversal of the Ninth Circuit's Caldwell holding. Several newsmen
told me that initially they were extremely worried about the subpoena
spate of two years ago, but that now their anxieties have greatly subsided
as a result of the strong stand taken by the journalism profession and the
tentative victories in court. However, a Supreme Court declaration that
the first amendment is in no wise abridged by the practice of
sUQPoenaing reporters would, these newsmen assert, set off a wave of
anxiety among sources. The publicity and imprimatur that would
accompany such a Court holding would, in the opinion of these reporters,
create an atmosphere even more uncongenial to source relationships than
that which occurred two years ago, when the constitutional question
remained in doubt. 264
Unfortunately, Blasi proved more prophetic than persuasive. With lip service
to "some" First Amendment protection for newsgathering,265 Justice White
proceeded to list all the First Amendment values that were not at issue in these
three cases:
[N]o intrusions upon speech or assembly, no prior restraint or restriction
on what the press may publish, and no express or implied command that
the press publish what it prefers to withhold. No exaction or tax for the
privilege of publishing, and no penalty, civil or criminal, related to the
content of published material . . . . No attempt is made to require the
press to publish its sources of information or indiscriminately to disclose
them on request.
The sole issue before us is the obligation of reporters to respond to
grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do and to answer questions
relevant to an investigation into the commission of a crime. 266
Framing the issue thus told the entire story.
Emphasizing that "'the publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity
from the application of general laws, ",267 a theme he would return to in other
newsgathering cases,268 White further minimized the protection accorded
federal shield law, and, in the view of some, its no-compromise stance was a major reason
why no federal legislation was ever enacted. See id. at 126.
264 Reply Brief at 13, In re Pappas, 402 U.S. 942 (1971) (No. 70-94). Blasi's study is
treated at length in Vince Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH.
L. REv. 229 (1972).
265 See supra note 117.
266 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681-82 (1972).
267 Id. at 683 (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937».
268 See cases cited supra note 201.
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newsgathering by undennining the "right to know" value on which it is predicated:
"[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of
special access to information not available to the public generally.,,269 Citing the
absence of a reporter's privilege under either the common law or the "prevailing
constitutional view,,,27o White noted that, while "[a] number of states" have
provided a statutory privilege, "the majority have not done so, and none has been
provided by federal statute.,,271
On the records now before us, we perceive no basis for holding that the
public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury
proceedings is insufficient to override the consequential, but uncertain,
burden on news gathering that is said to result from insisting that
reporters, like other citizens, respond to relevant questions put to them in
the course of a valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial. 272
White gave particularly short shrift to Branzburg's claim of privilege.
Insofar as any reporter in these cases undertook not to reveal or testify
about the crime he witnessed, his claim of privilege under the First
Amendment presents no substantial question. The crimes of news
sources are no less reprehensible and threatening to the public interest
when witnessed by a reporter than when they are not. 273
For the others, White said, "the evidence fails to demonstrate that there would be a
significant constriction of the flow of news to the public if this Court reaffirms the
prior common-law and constitutional rule regarding the testimonial obligations of
newsmen. ,,274
Even assuming some informants will refuse to talk to reporters, White
continued,
[W]e cannot accept the argument that the public interest in possible
future news about crime from undisclosed, unverified sources must take
precedence over the public interest in pursuing and prosecuting those
crimes reported to the press by informants and in thus deterring the
commission of such crimes in the future. 275

269
270
271
272
273
274
275

408 U.S. at 684.
Id. at 685-86.
Id. at 689.
Id. at 690-91.
Id. at 692.
Id. at 693.
Id. at 695.
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One by one, White rebutted and rejected each of the arguments raised by the
reporters, returning finally to clarify the scope of First Amendment protection for
.
news gathering. \
[G]rand jury investigations if instituted or conducted other than in good
faith, would pose wholly different issues for resolution under the First
Amendment. Official harassment of the press undertaken not for the
purposes of law enforcement but to disrupt a reporter's relationship with
his news sources would have no justification. 276
That was the extent of the concession won by the press in Branzburg v.
Hayes-far less than the Ninth Circuit opinion or even the original District Court's
protective order. Even though numerous shield law bills have been introduced in
Congress since Branzburg,277 enactment has always been considered a long shot,
and all. First Amendment protections for newsgathering activities might well be
stronger if Branzburg had never reached the United States Supreme Court.
But if Branzburg was a strategic miscalculation, one cannot say that pursuit of
a testimonial privilege for journalists was irrational or irresponsible. From the
perspective of the key actors at the time, the odds favoring success were at least
even, and important segments of the press saw prospective benefits of victory as
greater than the downside costs. Perhaps the best thing to come out of the case was
the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, which is today the premier
legal information clearing house and litigator representing working journalists.
B. The Legislative Fiasco

According to Floyd McKay, principal chronicler of the Reporters
Committee's early years, the Caldwell case was the precipitating factor in the
formation of the committee in 1970.278 Thirty-five -to forty reporters attended a
meeting at Georgetown University to discuss Caldwell and other cases.279 Led by
J. Anthony Lukas and Fred Graham of The New York Times and Jack Nelson of the
Los Angeles Times, the group took the name Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press and created a steering committee of eleven colleagues. 28o
What distinguished the Reporters Committee from other media organizations
that became involved in Caldwell and its companion cases was its insistence that
working reporters, not editors or publishers, would call the shots. 281 "Reporters
needed their own advocacy group," James Doyle of the Washington Star told

Id. at 707-08.
See infra Part V.B.
278 McKay, supra note 228, at 108.
279 Id. at 109; see also Joe Holley, Obituary, Jack Landau; Founded Reporter Group,
WASH. POST, Aug. 17,2008, at C7 (describing the fonnation of the RCFP).
280 McKay, supra note 228, at 109.
281 See id.
276

277
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McKay in an intervit!w, "and we could not be sure publishers would do the job.,,282
Indeed, the Times lawyers' initial reaction to the Caldwell case seemed indicative
of a philosophical difference between working journalists and their managers,
although the split over absolute versus qualified privilege had not yet broken down
along those lines---:at least in the Supreme Court briefs. 283
Whatever the basis for that split, it was to prove fatal to enacting a statutory
remedy for the Branzburg decision. By the time that decision was handed down in
1972, the Reporters Committee was led by Jack Landau, a reporter-lawyer for
Newhouse News Service who had returned to his Supreme Court beat after a brief
stint in the Nixon Justice Department. 284 Landau's aggressive advocacy for an
absolute privilege in the years following the Branzburg decision, and his
unwillingness to compromise with media organizitions willing to accept some
qualifications, must bear a fair portion of the blame-or credit~for Congress's
failure to enact a shield law in the early 1970s, when reaction to the Nixon
administration's contempt for the press and Branzburg made such enactment most
likely.285
"[R]eacting to what he called 'the recent wave of broad and sweeping
subpoenas which. have issued from the Justice Department, '" Sen. Thomas H.
McIntyre (D-N.H.) introduced the first testimonial privilege bill of the decade on
March 5, 1970. 286 Although McIntyre's bill died in committee, Sen. James Pearson
(R-Kan.) introduced another shield bill, S. 1311, in the beginning of the 92nd
Congress in January 1971. 287 According to Sen. Sam Ervin (D-N.C.), the most
authoritative reporter of this legislative process, the Pearson bill was "met with a
less than urgent response," and the press adopted a "'wait and see' attitude" toward
the bill pending resolution of the Caldwell case. 288
Ervin's Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights held hearings on the
Pearson bill in September and October 1971.289 Months earlier, the White House
Id.
283 Although the new Reporters Committee was "emerging as the principal advocate
of the 'no compromise' position on reporter confidentiality," McKay, supra note 228, at
112, both the American Newspaper Publishers Association and the American Society of
Newspaper Editors also urged an absolute privilege. See supra text accompanying notes
255-258. Later, however, ANP A would split with the Reporters Committee to support
compromise legislation. See infra note 302 and accompanying text.
284 See McKay, supra note 228, at 112-13; supra text accompanying notes 228-230.
285 Although a number of states had already enacted shield laws, see supra notes
224-225 and accompanying text, similar bills had been introduced unsuccessfully in nearly
every Congress since 1929. See VAN GERPEN, supra note 18, at 147-48. Popular support
for a shield law had never been higher than immediately after the Branzburg decision was
handed down. See McKay, supra note 228, at 115.
286 Sam J. Ervin, Jr., In Pursuit of a Press Privilege, 11 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 233, 25152 (1973-74) (citing S. 3552, 91st Congo (1970».
287 Id. at 253 (citing S. 1311, 92d Congo (1971».
288 Id. at 253-54. The government's certiorari petition in Caldwell was pending at the
time. See supra text accompanying note 58.
289 Id. at 254.
282
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and Justice Department had begun taking a more conciliatory approach to the
issuance of subpoenas against reporters,290 and Ervin recalls that "most press
spokesmen who commented on the Pearson bill recommended that Congress
proceed cautiously. Most urged that a statutory privilege be enacted only if the
Supreme Court refused to recognize a constitutional privilege.,,291 Indeed, Ervin
says, "the subpoena problem seemed to come last in the minds of most
witnesses. ,,292 The bill went nowhere in 1971. 293
When the Branzburg decision came down in June 1972, Senator Alan
Cranston (D-Cal.) immediately introduced legislation providing an absolute shield
for journalists in both "federal and state proceedings.,,294 But the press was
irreparably divided. The inactive Joint Media Committee was "revived for the
purpose of drafting new legislation" embodying a qualified privilege.295 Their bill
was introduced by Senator Walter Mondale (D-Minn.) on August 17296 and
Representative Charles Whalen (R-Ohio) on September 5.297 Ervin introduced his
own qualified privilege bill on August 16.298 No new hearings were held in the
Senate, and although the House judiciary Committee held a series of hearings in
late September, Congress adjourned without taking action. 299

290 In February, Attorney General John Mitchell issued a statement "regret[ting]" any
misunderstanding arising from the issuance of subpoenas to the press and promising that,
"in the future, no subpoenas will be issued to the press without a good faith attempt by the
Department to reach a compromise acceptable to both parties." Ervin, supra note 286, at
251 (citing N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 6, 1970, at 40). Mitchell's press spokesman at the time was
Jack Landau. McKay, supra note 228, at 112. At a press conference in May, President
Nixon said he took a "very jaundiced view" of subpoenaing the notes of reporters or taking
action requiring reporters to reveal their sources. Ervin, supra note 286, at 254 (citing The
President's News Conference, 7 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 703, 705 (May 1, 1971».
Also, in May, Mitchell told an interviewer he had no objection "to legislation protecting"
reporters' notes. [d. at 252. Finally, in August, Mitchell's Justice Department issued
restrictive guidelines to U.S. attorneys regarding subpoenas for journalists. See supra notes
226--228 and accompanying text. As noted therein, the guidelines were originally drafted
by Landau. !d.
291 Ervin, supra note 286, at 254--55.
292 [d. at 255.
293 See id. at 254--255.
294 Ervin, supra note 286, at 255 (citing S. 3796, 92d Congo (1972».
295 [d. at 256. Members included "the American Society of Newspaper Editors, the
Associated Press Managing Editors Association, Sigma Delta Chi (the national journalism
society), the National Press Photographers Association, and the Radio Television News
Directors Association." [d.
296 [d. (citing S. 3932, 92d Congo (1972».
297 [d. (citing H.R. 16527, 92d Congo (1972».
298 [d. (citing S. 3925, 92d Congo (1972».
299 [d. (citing Hearings on Newsman's Privilege Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Congo (1972».
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Ervin notes that "the public's attention was not really drawn" to the issue until
two reporters were jailed in the fall of 1972 for refusing to reveal their sources. 300
"[T]he attitude of the press began to harden," Ervin says, and more groups began
"urging an absolute" privilege. 30l The American Newspaper Publishers
Association, which supported an absolute privilege, spearheaded a new press
alliance called the Ad Hoc Coordinating Committee, which tried to draft a bill
acceptable to all factions. 302 The Joint Media Committee, finding that a qualified
bill "no longer commanded a majority" of its members, issued a statement
stressing the urgency oflegislative relief.303
In November 1972, President Nixon told the American Society of Newspaper
Editors that he did not think "federal legislation was warranted 'at this time, '"
further inflaming the situation, and in December, another reporter briefly was
jailed for failing to produce unpublished tapes of a confidential interview. 304 When
the 93rd Congress convened in January, eight bills and one joint resolution were
introduced in the Senate, and fifty-six bills were introduced in the House. 305 There
was only one problem: "the great number of proposals demonstrated
disagreement" among the legislators, and that, in tum, "only reflected the
divergence in the press.,,306 The Ad Hoc Coordinating Committee, created to find
common ground, produced six different bills, revealing differences not only in
philosophy, but also in estimates of what kind of legislation could pass. 307 Even
Anthony Amsterdam complicated the picture by suggesting that a judicial hearing
should be required before issuing a subpoena to reporters, an "interesting" concept,
says Ervin, but one that "represented a new, complicated, and untested legal
innovation, which reduced its political acceptability in Congress.,,308
Ervin admits to being conflicted himself; he introduced his own qualified
privilege bill at the beginning of a new round of hearings, and then found himself
convinced by the Reporters Committee on Freedom of the Press that any effective
legislation would have to cover the states as well as the federal government. 309 His
new bill, however, contained an exception for testimony regarding crimes
committed in the reporter's presence, which drew fire from both the Reporters

300 /d. at 256-57. Ervin is referring to Peter Bridge of the Newark News and William
FaIT of the Los Angeles Herald Examiner, who served twenty and forty-six days,
respectively, for refusing to reveal confidential sources. Id.
301 Id. at 258 (noting resolutions calling for enactment of an absolute privilege by the
American Society of Newspaper Editors, Sigma Delta Chi, the Radio Television News
Directors Association, and the American Newspaper Publishers Association).
302 Id.
303 /d. at 258-59.
304 Id.
305 Id. at 261.
306
307
308
309

/d.
/d. at 261-62.

Id. at 263.
Id. at 267-68.
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Committee and the Joint Media Committee. 310 Even after a dozen subpoenas were
issued during the hearings to news organizations "in a libel action filed by the
Committee to Re-Elect the President" (CREEP),311 the "fragmented press [could]
not coalesce behind one approach" to legislation in either the Senate or the
312
House.
"It did seem clear," Ervin said, "that unless the press groups themselves could
achieve some unanimity on the issue, it was likely to fail without any effort from
its opponents.,,313 And so it did. The Eighth314 and Second315 Circuit Courts of
Appeals had both declined to force reporters to reveal their confidential sources,
notwithstanding Branzburg. 316 In March 1973, Judge Charles Richey granted a
motion to quash ten subpoenas issued to news organizations by CREEP in the
Watergate matter,317 and prosecutors around the country had begun to show some
restraint. 318 Ervin notes that Watergate itself demonstrated to some previous
supporters that the press could do its job without a statutory privilege. 319 Despite
Representative Robert Kastenmeier's success in forging a compromise bill in his
House Judiciary subcommittee, he could not get a majority of the media
representatives to support it. 320 The legislative effort crumbled.

!d. at 270-71 & n.132.
!d. at 269.
312 [d. at 270.
313 [d.
314 Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986,992-93 (8th Cir. 1972) ("We are aware of
the prior cases holding that the First Amendment does not grant to reporters a testimonial
privilege to withhold news sources. But to routinely grant motions seeking compulsory
disclosure of anonymous news sources without first inquiring into the substance of a libel
allegation would utterly emasculate the fundamental principles that underlay the line of
cases articulating the constitutional restrictions to be engrafted upon the enforcement of
State libel laws. Such a course would also overlook the basic philosophy at the heart of the
summary judgment doctrine.") (citations omitted).
315 Baker v. F & F Inv. Co., 470 F.2d 778, 784-85 (2d Cir. 1972) ("Manifestly, the
Court's concern with the integrity of the grand jury as an investigating arm of the criminal
justice system distinguishes Branzburg from the case presently before us. If, as Mr. Justice
Powell noted in that case, instances will arise in which First Amendment values outweigh
the duty of a journalist to testifY even in the context of a criminal investigation, surely in
civil cases, courts must recognize that the public interest in non-disclosure of journalists'
confidential news sources will often be weightier than the private interest in compelled
disclosure.").
316 Ervin, supra note 286, at 272.
317 See Democratic Nat'! Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394, 1399 (D.D.C. 1973);
supra note 309 and accompanying text.
318 Ervin, supra note 286, at 273.
319 !d. at 274.
320 !d. at 274-75.
310
311
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VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has examined Branzburg v. Hayes as part of a continuing·
exploration into the mobilization of the press to shape First Amendment doctrine
through strategic litigation. In ·Branzburg, the press failed, despite several
favorable indicators, and that failure had grave implications for any First
Amendment right to 'gather news. Although it is impossible to say conclu·sively
why a Supreme Court decision goes this way or that, we can safely suggest that
differences within the press, between Earl Caldwell and The New York Times,
indeed, between reporters and their bosses generally,321 and between advocates of
an absolute versus a qualified privilege, did not help the press make its case. The
latter division proved to be even more significant when the issue moved to the
legislative arena.
The tragedy of Branzburg v. Hayes was the failure of the Court to adopt
Anthony Amsterdam's argument that, for First Amendment purposes, the
distinction between news gathering and publishing is an artificial one, advanced by
the government to divide and conquer.322 The lesson of Branzburg v. Hayes and its
aftermath is that a "house divided" is not likely to be effective in molding
constitutional doctrine or winning a legislative privilege.

321 McKay recounts a story told by Jack Landau about when Landau solicited
Marshall Field, publisher of the Chicago Sun-Times, for fmancial support for the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press. After Landau's pitch, Field replied, "Well, Mr.
Landau, I'm not really very comfortable funding a group that calls itself the Reporters
Committee." McKay, supra note 228, at 122-23.
322 Brieffor Respondent at 48-49, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 7057).

